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Abstract
Replication is complicated in psychological research because studies of a given
psychological phenomenon can never be direct or exact replications of one another,
and thus effect sizes vary from one study of the phenomenon to the next—an issue of
clear importance for replication. Current large scale replication projects represent an
important step forward for assessing replicability, but provide only limited informa-
tion because they have thus far been designed in a manner such that heterogeneity
either cannot be assessed or is intended to be eliminated. Consequently, the non-
trivial degree of heterogeneity found in these projects represents a lower bound on
heterogeneity.
We recommend enriching large scale replication projects going forward by em-
bracing heterogeneity. We argue this is key for assessing replicability: if effect sizes
are sufficiently heterogeneous—even if the sign of the effect is consistent—the phe-
nomenon in question does not seem particularly replicable and the theory underlying
it seems poorly constructed and in need of enrichment. Uncovering why and revising
theory in light of it will lead to improved theory that explains heterogeneity and in-
creases replicability. Given this, large scale replication projects can play an important
role not only in assessing replicability but also in advancing theory.
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1 Introduction
The validity of research in the biomedical and social sciences is under intense scrutiny at
present, with published findings failing to replicate at an alarming rate. This problem
appears particularly acute in psychology, where the failure to replicate several prominent
findings (for example, Bargh et al. (1996, 2001); Carney et al. (2010); Bem (2011)) has
attracted the attention of both academics and the popular press.
One positive development that has emerged from this unfortunate situation is an in-
creased interest in planning and conducting replications, as evidenced by inter alia large
scale replication projects such as the Many Labs project (Klein et al., 2014), the Open
Science Collaboration (OSC) project (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), and Registered
Replication Reports (RRRs; Simons et al. (2014)) in which one or more psychological phe-
nomena is investigated across multiple laboratories. The projects involve heroic coordi-
nation efforts and require tremendous resources but offer the promise of allowing for the
assessment of the replicability of individual phenomena and, perhaps taken together, psy-
chological research as a whole.
Nonetheless, replication is complicated in psychological research because studies of a
given psychological phenomenon can never be direct or exact replications of one another
(Rosenthal, 1991; Tsang and Kwan, 1999; Brandt et al., 2014; Stroebe and Strack, 2014;
Fabrigar and Wegener, 2016). Instead, studies differ at minimum in their method factors,
that is, anything—known or unknown—pertaining to the implementation of the study
that is not directly related to the theory under investigation. Method factors can include
seemingly major factors such as the operationalization of the dependent measure(s), the
operationalization of the experimental manipulation(s), and unaccounted for moderators
but also seemingly minor factors such as the social context, the subject pool, and the time
of day (for a comprehensive list, see Brown et al. (2014)). Differences in method factors
result in heterogeneity, that is, effect sizes that vary from one study of a given phenomenon
to the next—an issue of clear importance for replication.
While current large scale replication projects represent an important step forward for
assessing replicability, they provide only limited information. Specifically, and consistent
with the fact that heterogeneity has heretofore been underappreciated in psychology, these
2
projects have thus far been designed in a manner such that heterogeneity either cannot
be assessed or is intended to be eliminated. Consequently, the nontrivial degree of het-
erogeneity found in these projects represents a lower bound on heterogeneity. Given this,
we recommend enriching large scale replication projects going forward by embracing het-
erogeneity through the systematic variation of method factors. We argue this is key for
assessing replicability: if effect sizes are sufficiently heterogeneous from one study to the
next—even if, for example, the sign of the effect is consistent—the phenomenon in question
does not seem particularly replicable and the theory underlying it seems poorly constructed
and in need of enrichment. In particular, what are believed to be method factors either
interact with theoretical moderators or are in fact unaccounted for theoretical moderators.
Uncovering this and revising theory in light of it will lead to improved theory that explains
heterogeneity and increases replicability. Given this, large scale replication projects can
play an important role not only in assessing replicability but also in advancing theory—a
fact which has been overlooked to date.
In the remainder of this paper, we briefly review current large scale replication projects.
We then discuss assessments of heterogeneity based on them, offer recommendations for
enriching them, and discuss challenges with large scale replication in other domains of
psychological research. We conclude with a brief discussion.
2 Large Scale Replication Projects
2.1 Many Phenomena, One Study: The Open Science Collabo-
ration Project
The OSC project is a large scale replication project consisting of replications of 100 social
and cognitive psychology phenomena published in three journals (Psychological Science,
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, and Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition) and conducted by 270 authors. Fundamental to the
approach was that each phenomenon was replicated only once thus allowing for broad
coverage across a host of phenomena.
The OSC authors examined five indicators of replicability, and results were, broadly
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speaking, consistent across them:
Replication effects were half the magnitude of original effects, representing a
substantial decline. Ninety-seven percent of original studies had statistically
significant results. Thirty-six percent of replications had statistically significant
results; 47% of original effect sizes were in the 95% confidence interval of the
replication effect size; 39% of effects were subjectively rated to have replicated
the original result; and if no bias in original results is assumed, combining
original and replication results left 68% with statistically significant effects.
In sum, the results seem grim.
The major strength of the OSC project is its broad coverage of studies across social
and cognitive psychology. However, this comes with a major limitation: because each
phenomenon was replicated only once, the OSC project replication setting is the canonical
and classical one of a single “original” study and a single “replication” study of each
phenomenon.
Because there is only a single replication study of each phenomenon, heterogeneity
cannot be assessed and accounted for. While this is a limitation in and of itself, it also means
many of the indicators of replicability discussed above necessarily ignore heterogeneity and
are thus miscalibrated.
For example, consider the second—that only 36% of replication studies had statistically
significant results whereas 97% of the original studies did—which has gained traction in
the popular press and reflects the classic definition of replication employed in practice (i.e.,
a subsequent study is considered to successfully replicate a prior study if either both fail
to attain statistical significance or both attain statistical significance and are directionally
consistent). When heterogeneity exists but is ignored, the Type I error of the single study
significance tests on which these 36% and 97% figures are based is inflated above the
nominal size α and standard sample size and power formulae overstate power and thus
understate Type II error (McShane and Bo¨ckenholt, 2017).
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2.2 One Phenomenon, Many Studies: The Many Labs Project
and Registered Replication Reports
Overcoming the major limitation of the OSC project are the Many Labs project and RRRs
which feature multiple replication studies of one phenomenon (RRRs) or a small number of
phenomena (Many Labs) across multiple independent laboratories thus allowing for deeper
examination of these phenomena. In particular, the Many Labs project investigates sixteen
classic and contemporary psychological research phenomena across thirty-six independent
samples totaling 6,344 subjects; each of the thirty-six laboratories involved in the project
used identical materials and administered them through a web browser in order to ensure
procedural consistency across laboratories. Similarly, RRRs consist of “a set of studies from
a variety of laboratories that all followed an identical, vetted protocol designed to reproduce
the original method and finding as closely as possible” (Simons et al., 2014) and have thus
far investigated phenomena that include the facial feedback hypothesis, ego depletion,
the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions, and the link between commitment
to and betrayal of a romantic relationship (Wagenmakers et al., 2016; Hagger et al., 2016;
Bouwmeester et al., 2017; Cheung et al., 2016). Thus, the Many Labs and RRR approach
allows data to be integrated via meta-analysis—with the data from each laboratory treated
as an independent replication study—to provide more definitive and informative inferences
and conclusions.
The primary indicator of replicability used by the Many Labs and RRR authors is
whether a meta-analysis that pools the data across the multiple replication studies of a
given phenomenon matches the statistical significance and direction of the original study.
Empirically, evaluations of replicability diverge between the Many Labs and RRR authors,
with the Many Labs authors replicating fourteen of the sixteen phenomena they examined
and RRR authors generally failing to replicate phenomena thus far. Rather than reflecting
any differences in, for example, the replication approach taken, we believe this divergence
more likely reflects the choice of phenomena examined by the Many Labs and RRR authors.
The major strength of the Many Labs and RRR approach is that pooling data across
multiple replication studies allows for more powerful evaluations of replicability—ones that
allow heterogeneity to, at least to some degree, be assessed and accounted for. However, this
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comes with a major limitation: due to the vast resources required to conduct replications
across multiple laboratories, the approach is necessarily more focused on one (or a small
number of) phenomena and thus does not provide broad coverage across psychology or
domains of it. In sum, the strengths and limitations of the Many Labs and RRR approach
are opposite those of the OSC project. Yet, like the OSC project, this approach has thus
far defined replication in terms that focus on the sign and statistical significance of results.
3 Assessing Heterogeneity in Large Scale Replication
Projects
In this section, we discuss assessments of heterogeneity—that is, variation in effect sizes
from one study of a given phenomenon to the next resulting from differences in method
factors—based on large scale replication projects, in particular those following the one
phenomenon, many studies approach (i.e., because those following the many phenomena,
one study approach do not allow for such assessments). While by no means the only or
necessarily the best measure, we here discuss heterogeneity in terms of the I2 statistic (i.e.,
the proportion of the variation in observed effect sizes due to heterogeneity rather than
sampling error) because it is easily interpretable and comparable across phenomena. To
place I2 in context, Pigott (2012) defines low, medium, and high heterogeneity in psycho-
logical research as I2 of 25%, 50%, and 75% respectively (see also Higgins and Thompson
(2002)). We use this relative measure of heterogeneity here because it facilitates compar-
ison across different phenomena. However, as we discuss in the next section, the absolute
level of heterogeneity is also relevant for assessing replicability.
Heterogeneity has generally been regarded as important across sets of studies that
consist of general (i.e., systematic or conceptual) replications, and a host of recent data
convincingly demonstrates that it is indeed rife and large across them. Consider, for exam-
ple, the sets of studies included in the comprehensive meta-analyses of the sort published in
Psychological Bulletin, the premier outlet for meta-analyses in psychology. van Erp et al.
(2017) examined heterogeneity estimates from 705 meta-analyses published there between
1990 and 2013 and found a median I2 of 71%. Similarly, Stanley et al. (2017) surveyed 200
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recent meta-analyses published there and found a median I2 of 74%.
While the finding that heterogeneity is so large in these meta-analyses may perhaps not
be so surprising given that the studies included in them tend to feature tremendous variation
in their method factors, more surprising—as well as more interesting and more important—
is that heterogeneity can also be substantial even across sets of studies that consist entirely
of close replications (i.e., studies that use identical or very similar materials). In particular,
heterogeneity persists, and to a reasonable degree, even in large scale replication projects
such as the Many Labs project and RRRs where rigid, vetted protocols with identical study
materials are followed across laboratories in a deliberate attempt to eliminate differences
in method factors and thus heterogeneity.
Specifically, random effects meta-analyses conducted by the Many Labs authors yielded
nonzero estimates of heterogeneity for all fourteen of the phenomena they found to be
non-null and the average I2 across these phenomena was 40% (see Table 3 of Klein et al.
(2014)). In addition, among the 6,344 Many Labs subjects were 1,000 recruited via Ama-
zon’s Mechanical Turk. The study materials were administered to these 1,000 subjects
over seven unique days, beginning on August 29, 2013, and ending on September 11, 2013
(i.e., seven consecutive days excluding Fridays, weekends, and the Labor Day holiday). Re-
stricting attention to only these subjects and treating each unique day as a separate sample
yields seven extremely close replications of each phenomenon. Again, however, despite the
extreme degree of closeness, heterogeneity is nontrivial: random effects meta-analyses yield
nonzero estimates of heterogeneity for nine of the fourteen non-null phenomena, and across
these, the average I2 was 21% (McShane et al., 2016). Similarly, a moderate amount
of heterogeneity has been found in RRRs (see, for example, Eerland et al. (2016) and
Hagger et al. (2016)). In sum, despite protocols explicitly designed to eliminate differences
in method factors and thus heterogeneity, heterogeneity was nonetheless nontrivial in large
scale replication projects following the one phenomenon, many studies approach.
This is astounding not only from a substantive perspective but also from a purely
statistical perspective. In particular, when heterogeneity is in fact nonzero but there are a
relatively small number of studies / laboratories (as is unfortunately the case in the Many
Labs project and RRRs), standard estimators of heterogeneity are biased downwards and
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estimates of zero heterogeneity result implausibly often (see, for example, Chung et al.
(2013b) and Chung et al. (2013a)). For this and related reasons, the Type I error of the
significance test of zero heterogeneity is often inflated above the nominal size α and power
is low (Huedo-Medina et al., 2006; Ioannidis et al., 2007).
Based on this poorly calibrated significance test, many have wrongly concluded that
large scale replication projects do not provide evidence for heterogeneity. For instance, the
Many Labs authors write “tests of heterogeneity suggested that most of the variation in
effects is attributable to measurement error” (by which we believe they mean sampling error
as their analyses do not account for measurement error). In contrast, we note that, even if
one believes that homogeneity is plausible and that significance testing is a reasonable thing
to do, one should be very skeptical of this particular significance test unless the number
of studies is indeed very large (i.e., to allow for sufficient power). Further, laying aside
any skepticism of significance testing, we note that the privileged role given to the null
hypothesis of homogeneity by this particular significance test does not seem reasonable in
psychological research because studies of a given psychological phenomenon can never be
direct or exact replications of one another; instead, rather than assuming homogeneity and
only rejecting it given sufficient evidence to the contrary, it seems much more reasonable
to assume some degree of heterogeneity and only conclude in favor of homogeneity given
sufficient evidence for it.
Given that large scale replication projects have typically shared their data even at the
most granular level, there is great opportunity to move beyond poorly-performing estima-
tors and significance tests in order to better assess heterogeneity. For example, consider
again the Many Labs project. Current assessments of heterogeneity are based on the
standard two-parameter (one intercept, one variance component) so-called random effects
meta-analytic model fit to a single summary statistic computed from the individual-level
data from each of the thirty-six laboratories and fit to each of the sixteen phenomena exam-
ined by the project entirely separately. Instead, it would be far superior to base assessments
of heterogeneity on a hierarchical (or multilevel) model fit to the individual-level observa-
tions across all laboratories and phenomena jointly. The partial pooling, particularly of
the variance components, possible with such a model would yield much more reliable and
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precise estimates.
In sum, in large scale replication projects such as Many Labs and RRRs, we should—
for substantive reasons (i.e., protocols designed to eliminate heterogeneity) and statistical
reasons (i.e., estimators and significance tests that perform poorly in a manner that falsely
suggests homogeneity)—expect to observe little to no heterogeneity. The very fact we
observe a nontrivial degree of it is compelling evidence that heterogeneity is not only the
norm but also cannot be avoided in psychological research—even if every effort is taken to
eliminate it.
4 Enriching Large Scale Replication Projects
In this section, we make four recommendations pertaining to the design of large scale repli-
cation projects, the statistical analysis of the data resulting from them, and assessments of
the replicability of the phenomena investigated by them. We then provide an illustration
based on the anchoring effect (Jacowitz and Kahneman, 1995) of how these recommenda-
tions can improve theory in a manner that explains heterogeneity and increases replicability.
Because heterogeneity cannot be avoided in psychological research and because assessing
and accounting for heterogeneity is not possible when analyzing single studies in isolation
but only when analyzing multiple studies jointly, our first recommendation is that future
large scale replication projects follow the one phenomenon, many studies approach of the
Many Labs project and RRRs rather than the many phenomena, one study approach of the
OSC project. This offers substantive as well as statistical benefits: beyond allowing for the
“mere” assessment of heterogeneity, it can suggest that method factors either interact with
theoretical moderators or are in fact unaccounted for theoretical moderators (as discussed
in greater depth below); it also provides better calibration of Type I and Type II error and
yields more efficient estimates of overall average effects (McShane and Bo¨ckenholt, 2014,
2017).
Before proceeding to our second recommendation, it is important to understand that
the degree of heterogeneity across set of studies depends critically on the variation in the
method factors across the set. For example, it is unsurprising that studies from the Many
Labs project and RRRs are less heterogeneous than studies included in meta-analyses
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published in Psychological Bulletin as the former used identical materials while the latter
did not. Similarly, it is unsurprising that the Mechanical Turk subsample of the Many
Labs sample is less heterogeneous than the full sample as, for example, differences in the
subject population across days on Mechanical Turk are likely to be smaller than those
across the thirty-six Many Labs. Put differently, the Mechanical Turk subsample features
less variation in method factors than the full Many Labs sample which in turn features
less variation in method factors than the published meta-analyses. In sum, the less (more)
varied a set of studies are in their method factors, the smaller (larger) heterogeneity will
be.
Given this, the Many Labs and RRR approach—due to the rigidness of the protocol
designed to eliminate differences in method factors and thus heterogeneity—provides at
best limited information about—indeed, a lower bound on—heterogeneity. Specifically,
because all laboratories use identical materials, any information on heterogeneity provided
by this approach relates almost exclusively to differences in the subject populations across
the laboratories.
Instead, systematically varying various method factors would provide much more infor-
mation about the phenomenon in question. For example, when a set of studies features
great variation in their method factors and an assessment of heterogeneity is relatively low,
this suggests that the phenomenon in question is highly stable with regards to variation in
these factors; in other words, these method factors are unlikely to interact with theoretical
moderators and the underlying theory may be relatively tight (i.e., in terms of accounting
for all relevant theoretical moderators). A large assessment suggests just the opposite,
namely that the phenomenon in question is not stable with regards to variation in these
factors and the underlying theory may be in need of improvement. On the other hand,
when a set of studies features little variation in their method factors and an assessment of
heterogeneity is relatively low, this is not particularly informative or probative (although
in this setting, a large assessment suggests even more greatly that the phenomenon in ques-
tion is not stable with regards to variation in these factors and the underlying theory may
be in need of improvement).
Consequently, our second recommendation is that future large scale replication projects
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systematically vary method factors across the laboratories involved in the project (see also
Ehrenberg and Bound (1993), Lindsay and Ehrenberg (1993), and Baribault et al. (2018));
ideally, in doing so, they would also take an explicit stance about which ones are likely to
be major and which are likely to be minor.
Our third recommendation is that researchers analyze the data resulting from these
projects using a hierarchical model fit to the individual-level observations, and specifically
that all theoretical moderators should be modeled via covariates while all other potential
moderators—that is, method factors—should induce variation (i.e., heterogeneity). In
classical terms, this would amount to treating theoretical moderators as fixed and method
factors as random (though we would not limit ourselves or others to classical models).
Such a modeling approach requires researchers to take an explicit stance on which
moderators pertain to theory and which are heterogeneity-inducing method factors (for ex-
amples, see Chernev et al. (2015) and McShane and Bo¨ckenholt (2018)). While one might
argue this is difficult or perhaps even unrealistic, we believe it is necessary and beneficial.
Carefully-constructed theory involves the delineation of relevant constructs, interactions,
boundary conditions, and related matters. The modeling approach we suggest necessitates
this thus resulting in clearer and likely improved theory. In addition, the assessments of
heterogeneity resulting from this approach have the potential to enrich theory.
Finally, our fourth recommendation is that assessments of replicability should not de-
pend solely on estimates of effects, or worse, significance tests based on them. While we
do not claim to be able to offer a universal definition of replicability (indeed, we doubt
that one single definition would do across domains of research), we believe heterogeneity is
an important consideration in assessing replicability. For example, if an effect is estimated
to be large but highly heterogeneous, it may be highly replicable according to the classic
definition based on sign and statistical significance. However, in our view, sufficiently high
heterogeneity does not necessarily indicate replicability of a phenomenon—even if one can
be quite sure of its sign. Instead, while recognizing that what constitutes “sufficiently
high” heterogeneity will vary across domains of research and is a subject matter rather
than statistical issue, large variation in effect sizes to us indicates an underlying theory
that is poorly constructed and in need of enrichment. In particular, what are believed to
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be method factors either interact with theoretical moderators or are in fact unaccounted
for theoretical moderators. Uncovering this and revising theory in light of it will lead to
improved theory that explains heterogeneity and increases replicability.
As an example, consider the anchoring effect, the tendency for individuals to rely too
heavily on an initial piece of information offered (known as the “anchor”) when making de-
cisions. While there is an extremely large literature on this phenomenon (see, for example,
Chapters 6-8 of Gilovich et al. (2002)), one popular paradigm for it, used inter alia in the
Many Labs project, is to present subjects with a number that is clearly too small or too
large and then to ask them to estimate the distance between San Francisco and New York
City; subjects anchor on the number presented and thus tend to provide smaller (larger)
estimates when presented with the small (large) number.
Suppose a future large scale replication project follows our recommendations and em-
ploys the one phenomenon, many studies approach; systematically varies method factors;
analyzes the resulting data using a hierarchical model fit to the individual-level observa-
tions with the small versus large anchor specified as the only theoretical moderator; and
finds a very large average effect size but large heterogeneity such that the sign of the effect
is virtually always in the hypothesized direction. We would not stop here deeming the
replication a success.
Instead, we would ask what variation in method factors drove this large heterogene-
ity. Suppose the researchers examine their data and find that it results from the fact that
the studies were conducted across, say, the United States and Europe. Given the oper-
ationalization of the dependent measure employed (i.e., estimate of the distance between
San Francisco and New York City), it might not be surprising if European subjects relied
more heavily on the anchor than American subjects. This may or may not be interest-
ing for theory. On one hand, it could be deemed a mere nuisance interaction between
method factors and theoretical moderators—important to know about and perhaps even
to account for in the analysis but not of theoretical interest. On the other hand, it could
be deemed extremely theoretically interesting: assuming that American subjects are more
knowledgeable about the distance between San Francisco and New York City than Eu-
ropean subjects, perhaps this result suggests that expertise attenuates or even eliminates
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the anchoring effect. This could be examined by reformulating the hierarchical model to
account for expertise and by designing future studies to explicitly test this.
Of course, if method factors were systematically varied as we recommend, there would
be multiple operationalizations of the dependent measure employed (e.g., estimate of the
distance between Rome and Berlin). Consequently, one could examine also whether the re-
verse holds under this operationalization (i.e., whether American subjects rely more heavily
on the anchor than European subjects).
We recognize that conducting multiple replications as opposed to a single replication
and systematically varying various method factors is inherently quite challenging in terms of
coordination efforts, resources required, and related matters. It also requires more complex
designs for replication projects and more elaborate statistical models. Nonetheless, we
believe the benefits for assessing replicability (in particular the degree to which method
factors moderate the effect in question) and advancing theory are sufficiently valuable to
warrant this investment.
5 Large Scale Replication in Other Domains of Psy-
chological Research
Because current large scale replications projects have been prospective in nature, they have
thus far been restricted to phenomena for which data can be collected quickly and cheaply.
For example, one criterion the OSC project authors used to choose the three journals
from which they selected phenomena to replicate was that they “represent psychology sub-
disciplines that have a high frequency of studies that are feasible to conduct at relatively
low cost” (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). Similar criteria applied in the Many Labs
project and RRRs. Consequently, these projects have been constrained to certain types of
research (e.g., self-report or behavioral data collected from convenience samples) and thus
certain domains (e.g., cognitive and social psychology).
Given this, one might ask how to conduct large scale replication projects to assess
replicability and understand the role of method factors in other domains of psychological
research (e.g., clinical psychology, developmental psychology, behavioral genetics, behav-
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ioral neuroscience, health psychology, counseling psychology, and community psychology)
where data collection is slow and costly and individual datasets are typically much richer
(see also Tackett et al. (2017)). Since researchers in these domains often have access to large
amounts of shared (or shareable) archival data, we argue that a retrospective approach to
replication is valuable. In particular, researchers in these areas could pool data across
laboratories and model it using either a traditional meta-analytic model fit to summary
statistics or a hierarchical model fit to the individual-level observations. They could then
assess how effects replicate and vary across laboratories and investigate whether method
factors either interact with theoretical moderators or are in fact unaccounted for theoretical
moderators.
Further, a prospective approach to replication (that is respectful of the pace and cost of
data collection in these domains) is also possible and valuable. For example, a researcher
planning efforts to investigate some new phenomenon could ensure that variables that speak
to previously-investigated phenomena are built into the data collection protocol; in doing
so, the researcher could even consciously vary method factors. Then, the new data could
be pooled with previously collected data from other laboratories and analyzed via meta-
analytic or hierarchical models allowing replicability to be assessed in light of this variation
in method factors.
We recognize that barriers to large scale replication in these domains are likely to be
quite different from (and larger than) those encountered in current large scale replications
projects. For example, a move toward widespread data sharing and thus likely also from
single laboratory work to many laboratories work will require shifts in culture, incentives,
and infrastructure (e.g., standards for authorship, publication, tenure, and funding). It will
also require researchers to better understand statistical methods appropriate for analyzing
pooled data (i.e., hierarchical models) and more complex effects (e.g., curve or function
estimates as opposed to point estimates); laboratory-specific and other moderators most
relevant to include in such analyses; additional method factors that drive heterogeneity
(e.g., drop out mechanisms in longitudinal studies); ethical and legal implications of sharing
sensitive data; and how to harmonize measurements across laboratories (e.g., if they use
different measures of depression). Finally, as discussed in the prior section, assessments of
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replicability should not depend solely on estimates of effects or significance tests based on
them; particularly in the rich datasets common in these domains where there are multiple
effects of interest all of which are nonzero but which vary tremendously across laboratories,
heterogeneity simply must be a consideration in such assessments.
6 Discussion
We have discussed large scale replication projects as a positive development that has
emerged from recent difficulties with replication in psychological research. While we believe
current large scale replication projects represent an important step forward, we believe they
can be made even more informative.
Specifically, replication is complicated in psychological research because studies of a
given psychological phenomenon can never be direct or exact replications of one another.
As a consequence, heterogeneity cannot be avoided. Rather than trying in vain to eliminate
it, we instead argue that large scale replication projects going forward should embrace it
through the systematic variation of method factors.
There is already growing appreciation for the important role that method factors—
and the heterogeneity that results from varying them—play in traditional work outside
of large scale replication projects. For instance, researchers are increasingly considering
how method factors might moderate effects—if only to attempt to explain recent replica-
tion failures. More systematically, Simons et al. (2017) make the excellent suggestion that
all primary research papers include a “Constraints on Generality” statement that identifies
key method factors, thereby “help[ing] other researchers...when conducting a direct replica-
tion” and “encourag[ing] follow-up studies that test the boundary conditions of the original
finding.” Responding to this suggestion, Kennedy and Gelman (2018) propose that a Con-
straints on Generality statement provides the necessary information to allow for inference,
via hierarchical modeling and post-stratification (Park et al., 2004), regarding how quan-
tities of interest might vary along with the key method factors identified in the statement.
Thus, our recommendations can be seen as part of an increasing call for researchers to
think systematically about method factors and heterogeneity.
If our recommendations prove fruitful, perhaps a move to a many phenomena, many
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studies large scale replication approach may be warranted. This could potentially yield
even deeper benefits for theory. Specifically, if seemingly distinct phenomena are subject
to the same heterogeneity-inducing method factors, this might point to commonalities at
a higher theoretical level.
Our recommendations will not solve recent difficulties with replication in psychological
research. Indeed, they are not meant to. Rather, given that heroic coordination efforts and
tremendous resources are being invested in large scale replication projects, we would like
their payoff to be as large as possible. Large scale replication projects that systematically
vary method factors will provide much more information on the degree of heterogeneity and
thereby can play an important role not only in assessing replicability but also in advancing
theory.
References
Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., and Burrows, L. (1996). Automaticity of social behavior: Direct
effects of trait construct and stereotype activation on action. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 71, 2, 230–244.
Bargh, J. A., Gollwitzer, P. M., Lee-Chai, A., Barndollar, K., and Trotschel, R. (2001).
The automated will: Nonconscious activation and pursuit of behavioral goals. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology 81, 6, 1014–1027.
Baribault, B., Donkin, C., Little, D. R., Trueblood, J., Oravecz, Z., van Ravenzwaaij, D.,
White, C., De Boeck, P., and Vandekerckhove, J. (2018). Meta-studies for robust tests
of theory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, 11, 2607–2612.
Bem, D. J. (2011). Feeling the future: Experimental evidence for anomalous retroactive
influences on cognition and affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 100,
407–425.
Bouwmeester, S., Verkoeijen, P. P., Aczel, B., Barbosa, F., Be`gue, L., Bran˜as-Garza, P.,
Chmura, T. G., Cornelissen, G., Døssing, F. S., Esp´ın, A. M., et al. (2017). Regis-
16
tered replication report: Rand, greene, and nowak (2012). Perspectives on Psychological
Science 12, 3, 527–542.
Brandt, M. J., IJzerman, H., Dijksterhuis, A., Farach, F. J., Geller, J., Giner-Sorolla,
R., Grange, J. A., Perugini, M., Spies, J. R., and Van’t Veer, A. (2014). The replica-
tion recipe: What makes for a convincing replication? Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology 50, 217–224.
Brown, S. D., Furrow, D., Hill, D. F., Gable, J. C., Power, L. P., and Jacobs, W. J. (2014).
A duty to describe: Better the devil you know than the devil you don’t. Perspectives on
Psychological Science 9.
Carney, D. R., Cuddy, A. J., and Yap, A. J. (2010). Power posing brief nonverbal displays
affect neuroendocrine levels and risk tolerance. Psychological Science 21, 10, 1363–1368.
Chernev, A., Bo¨ckenholt, U., and Goodman, J. (2015). Choice overload: A conceptual
review and meta-analysis. Journal of Consumer Psychology 25, 2, 333–358.
Cheung, I., Campbell, L., LeBel, E. P., Ackerman, R., Aykutog˘lu, B., Bahn´ık, Sˇ., Bowen,
J., Bredow, C., Bromberg, C., Caprariello, P., et al. (2016). Registered replication report:
Study 1 from finkel, rusbult, kumashiro, & hannon (2002). Perspectives on Psychological
Science 11, 5, 750–764.
Chung, Y., Rabe-Hesketh, S., and Choi, I.-H. (2013a). Avoiding zero between-study vari-
ance estimates in random-effects meta-analysis. Statistics in medicine 32, 23, 4071–4089.
Chung, Y., Rabe-Hesketh, S., Dorie, V., Gelman, A., and Liu, J. (2013b). A non-degenerate
estimator for hierarchical variance parameters via penalized likelihood estimation. Psy-
chometrika 78, 4, 685–709.
Eerland, A., Sherrill, A. M., Magliano, J. P., Zwaan, R. A., Arnal, J., Aucoin, P., Berger,
S., Birt, A., Capezza, N., Carlucci, M., et al. (2016). Registered replication report: Hart
& albarrac´ın (2011). Perspectives on Psychological Science 11, 1, 158–171.
Ehrenberg, A. S. and Bound, J. A. (1993). Predictability and prediction. Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society. Series A (Statistics in Society) 167–206.
17
Fabrigar, L. R. and Wegener, D. T. (2016). Conceptualizing and evaluating the replication
of research results. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 66, 68–80.
Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., and Kahneman, D. (2002). Heuristics and biases: The psychology
of intuitive judgment. Cambridge university press.
Hagger, M. S., Chatzisarantis, N. L., Alberts, H., Anggono, C. O., Batailler, C., Birt, A. R.,
Brand, R., Brandt, M. J., Brewer, G., Bruyneel, S., et al. (2016). A multilab preregistered
replication of the ego-depletion effect. Perspectives on Psychological Science 11, 4, 546–
573.
Higgins, J. P. and Thompson, S. G. (2002). Quantifying heterogeneity in a meta-analysis.
Statistics in Medicine 21, 11, 1539–1558.
Huedo-Medina, T. B., Sa´nchez-Meca, J., Mar´ın-Mart´ınez, F., and Botella, J. (2006). As-
sessing heterogeneity in meta-analysis: Q statistic or i2 index? Psychological methods
11, 2, 193.
Ioannidis, J. P., Patsopoulos, N. A., and Evangelou, E. (2007). Uncertainty in heterogeneity
estimates in meta-analyses. BMJ: British Medical Journal 335, 7626, 914.
Jacowitz, K. E. and Kahneman, D. (1995). Measures of anchoring in estimation tasks.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 21, 11, 1161–1166.
Kennedy, L. and Gelman, A. (2018). How the recognition of constraints on generality can
provide a direction for generalizing research findings.
Klein, R. A., Ratliff, K., Nosek, B. A., Vianello, M., Pilati, R., Devos, T., Galliani, E. M.,
Brandt, M., van ’t Veer, A., Rutchick, A. M., Schmidt, K., Bahnik, S., Vranka, M.,
IJzerman, H., Hasselman, F., Joy-Gaba, J., Chandler, J. J., Vaughn, L. A., Brumbaugh,
C., van swol, L., Wichman, A., Packard, G., Brooks, B., Cemalcilar, Z., Storbeck, J.,
Bocian, K., Levitan, C., Bernstein, M. J., Krueger, L. E., Eisner, M., Davis, W. E.,
Nier, J. A., Nelson, A. J., Steiner, T. G., Mallett, R., Thompson, D., Huntsinger, J. R.,
Morris, W., Skorinko, J., and Kappes, H. (2014). Investigating variation in replicability:
A “many labs” replication project. Social Psychology 45, 3, 142–152.
18
Lindsay, R. M. and Ehrenberg, A. S. (1993). The design of replicated studies. The American
Statistician 47, 3, 217–228.
McShane, B. B. and Bo¨ckenholt, U. (2014). You cannot step into the same river twice:
When power analyses are optimistic. Perspectives on Psychological Science 9, 6, 612–625.
McShane, B. B. and Bo¨ckenholt, U. (2017). Single paper meta-analysis: Benefits for study
summary, theory-testing, and replicability. Journal of Consumer Research 43, 6, 1048–
1063.
McShane, B. B. and Bo¨ckenholt, U. (2018). Multilevel multivariate meta-analysis with
application to choice overload. Psychometrika 83, 1, 255–271.
McShane, B. B., Bo¨ckenholt, U., and Hansen, K. T. (2016). Adjusting for publication
bias in meta-analysis: An evaluation of selection methods and some cautionary notes.
Perspectives on Psychological Science 11, 5, 730–749.
Open Science Collaboration (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science.
Science 349, 6251, aac4716.
Park, D. K., Gelman, A., and Bafumi, J. (2004). Bayesian multilevel estimation with
poststratification: state-level estimates from national polls. Political Analysis 12, 4,
375–385.
Pigott, T. (2012). Advances in Meta-Analysis. Springer, New York, NY.
Rosenthal, R. (1991). Replication research in the social sciences, chap. Replication in
behavioral sciences, 1–30. Sage, Newbury Park, CA.
Simons, D. J., Holcombe, A. O., and Spellman, B. A. (2014). An introduction to registered
replication reports at perspectives on psychological science. Perspectives on Psychological
Science 9, 5, 552–555.
Simons, D. J., Shoda, Y., and Lindsay, D. S. (2017). Constraints on generality (cog): A
proposed addition to all empirical papers. Perspectives on Psychological Science 12, 6,
1123–1128.
19
Stanley, T., Carter, E. C., and Doucouliagos, H. (2017). What meta-analyses reveal about
the replicability of psychological research. Tech. rep., Deakin Laboratory for the Meta-
Analysis of Research.
Stroebe, W. and Strack, F. (2014). The alleged crisis and the illusion of exact replication.
Perspectives on Psychological Science 9, 1, 59–71.
Tackett, J. L., Lilienfeld, S. O., Patrick, C. J., Johnson, S. L., Krueger, R. F., Miller,
J. D., Oltmanns, T. F., and Shrout, P. E. (2017). It’s time to broaden the replicabil-
ity conversation: Thoughts for and from clinical psychological science. Perspectives on
Psychological Science 12, 5, 742–756.
Tsang, E. W. and Kwan, K.-M. (1999). Replication and theory development in organi-
zational science: A critical realist perspective. Academy of Management Review 24, 4,
759–780.
van Erp, S., Verhagen, J., Grasman, R. P. P. P., and Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2017). Estimates
of between-study heterogeneity for 705 meta-analyses reported in psychological bulletin
from 1990–2013. Journal of Open Psychology Data 5, 1.
Wagenmakers, E.-J., Beek, T., Dijkhoff, L., Gronau, Q. F., Acosta, A., Adams Jr, R.,
Albohn, D., Allard, E., Benning, S., Blouin-Hudon, E.-M., et al. (2016). Registered
replication report: Strack, martin, & stepper (1988). Perspectives on Psychological Sci-
ence 11, 6, 917–928.
20
